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' ;! In the Supreme Court 
;_~ of the State of Utah 
·-l 
-i 
--t 
-l 
-r 
0. K. CLAY, Administrator of the 
Estate of ARNOLD KARTCHNER, 
also known as ARNOLD G. KART-
CHNER, also known as ARNOLD 
GRANT KARTCHNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant,\ 
vs. -, Case No. 7705 
STEPHEN L. DUNFORD, PAUL H. ( 
STEVENS, BURNS L. DUNFORD \) 
and L. CLAYTON DUNFORD, do-
ing business as THE DUNFORD 
BREAD C0~1PANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Arnold G. Kartchner came to his death on the 24th day of 
June, 1950, following an automobile accident which occurred on 
that date at about the hour of 4:50 o'clock P.M. He left surviv-
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ing him as his only heirs-at-law two children, Edna Smith, a 
daughter, and Dean Kartchner, a son. The plaintiff, 0. K. 
Clay, was appointed by the District Court of Salt Lake County 
as the administrator of his estate, and, as such administrator, 
brought this action to recover damages from the defendants 
growing out of said accident. It is claimed by the plaintiff and 
the children of the deceased that the death of the deceased was 
caused by the negligence of one Montell Eccles Mangum, who 
at the time of the accident was driving a bread truck in the 
business of the defendants who operate the Dunford Bread 
Company. A trial was had before a jury and a verdict of no 
cause of action was returned. The accident occurred on the 
south side of 13th South Street in front of the deceased's home 
at No. 316 East 13th South Street. Briefly stated the material 
facts are as follows: 
A map' Exhibit "A" was prepared by Frank J. Cossey a 
member of the Engineering Department of Salt Lake City (T. 
149). The map is drawn to a scale of one inch to 10 feet. 
The traveled portion of 13th South Street is covered with as-
phalt. On the north side of the street the asphalt extends over 
to the north sidewalk. The distance between the south edge 
of the north sidewalk and the north edge of the south side-
walk is 50 feet ( T. 151-15 2) . The distance across the asphalt 
portion is 40 feet. The distance from the north edge of the 
south sidewalk to the south edge of the traveled portion of the 
highway is 18 feet (Exhibit "A.") There is an irregular strip 
of asphalt which extends beyond the main traveled portion 
of the highway. The south irregular edge of the asphalt extends 
to a point approximately 10 feet north of the north edge of 
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a:. 
the south sidewalk. This ten feet consists of dirt, some gravel, 
and some weeds and is not used for motor vehicle travel. 
Officer Peterson of the Salt Lake City Traffic Department 
made an investigation of the accident. He testified (T 57) 
that the macadam or hard portion of 13th South is approxi-
mately 41 feet extending from the sidewalk on the north; 
that south of the hard portion of the road, there is approxi-
mately 9 feet of dirt, gravel, and shoulder; that the impact 
occurred 167 feet east of an extended curbline on the east side 
of 3rd East, and 3 feet from this extended curbline north toward 
the road; that from the north edge of the south sidewalk to 
the south edge of the hard portion of the road is approximately 
9 feet (T 57-60); that the station wagon was approximately 
5 feet wide and was parked within one foot of the sidewalk 
facing easterly (T. 58). The Dunford bread truck was 99 feet 
east of the point of impact and partly on the shoulder of the 
road and facing the sidewalk (T. 59). The officer said (T. 60) 
that he determined the point of impact from scuffed marks, 
scraped marks on the station wagon itself, dented door handle 
on the left front door, brush marks along the fender and hood, 
the car itself was dusty and the marks were very recent; it 
was brushed clean, the dirt and dust in several places on the 
fender and hood had been brushed clean. There was a rear 
vision mirror on the side of the ]eft front door that had been 
broken off and was lying on the left front fender of the station 
wagon (T. 60). 
On the extreme right front of the Dunford truck there 
was a slight dent and brush marks about 5 feet 9 inches from 
the ground; on the right front door post there was a deep 
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impresson of what we believed to be specks of fresh blood and 
small portions of flesh; pictures of the automobiles involved 
were taken by Officer Snell. Exhibit "C" is a photograph of 
the Kartchner station wagon parked in front of his home (T. 
45). Also it will be noted from Exhibit "E" that the de-
fendants' driver had ample space to have avoided hitting the 
deceased in this action had he been keeping a proper lookout. 
The picture shows that if two cars were traveling abreast 
arrd going east, north of the station wagon that they would 
still not have been on the main traveled highway in this po-
sition (T. 81-85). Exhibit "D" is a photograph of the bread 
truck where it came to a stop after the accident (T. 48). It 
will be observed from this photograph that the left front 
wheel is slightly off the hard surfaced portion of the road 
and the distance between that point and the south sidewalk is 
indicated on the photograph. Exhibit "B" shows the in-
terior of the bread truck and certain spots and marks testified 
to by Officer Peterson on the outside of the truck (T. 63). 
We found brake marks of the bread truck on 13th South that 
extended from a point approximately 3 7 feet west of the rear 
wheels of the bread truck in a slanting direction toward the 
curb (T. 64). 13th South has a rather gentle slope off toward 
the South on the south side of the road; the north side of the 
road is more or less level. The brake marks of the Dunford 
truck lead to the station wagon which showed a rather slow 
arc in the shoulder up along side the station wagon. The 
tracks started in a slow turn going away from the hard surface 
of the road and then gradually came back toward the hard 
surface (T. 67). The tracks started about 100 feet west of 
the station wagon and went east toward the station wagon 
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(T. 68). The point of impact was off from the hard surface 
of the road (T. 69). At the time of impact, the tire marks 
of the bread truck were moving away from the station wagon; 
that would be the general direction (T. 70). Officer Peterson 
placed upon the Exhibit "A" the general course of the tire 
marks at the point they left the hard surfaced portion of the 
highway up to the point of impact with the station wagon. 
These marks are indicated by the red pencil marks starting 
at the irregular south edge of the asphalt, then turning to 
the south over the shoulder of the road, then back again toward 
the hard surfaced portion of the highway, and then stopping 
at the point where the bread truck struck the deceased (T. 
71) . On the right door post as indicated in the picture of the 
bread truck, there was what appeared to be blood stains on 
the door post itself (T. 74). Officer Peterson placed on the 
map, Exhibit "A," a red pencil dot to indicate the point of 
impact (T. 75). At the time the course of the bread truck 
was indicated by Officer Peterson, the replica of the st~tion 
wagon was not on the map and Officer Peterson testified after 
the replica of the station wagon was placed on the map that 
the red lines indicating the course of the bread truck did not 
give a true picture, and that the tire marks went to the point 
of impact. That is as far as we could follow them (T. 76). 
The station wagon was entirely off the hard surfaced portion 
of the highway. The left hand side of the station wagon was 
approximately } or 4 feet south of the edge of the hard sur-
faced portion of the roadway. I would think the point of 
impact would be a foot or two north of the car and possibly 
a foot or two off the road surface (T. 78}. 
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Mr. Montell Eccles Mangum, the driver of the defendants· 
truck testified that he made a wide turn on 3rd East and 13th 
' South Street, and after he had completed his turn, he was 
looking straight east (T. 171); that he observed particularly 
a station wagon automobile parked along the south side of the 
road fairly close to the sidewalk and facing east, but he did 
not observe any person in the vicinity of that automobile; 
that in his best judgment, he was traveling 20 miles per 
hour ( T. 172) . As he passed the station wagon, he heard 
a thud on the side of the truck and didn't have any idea of 
what had happened, but applied his brakes to stop and in-
vestigate, and thought posisbly that some kids had thrown 
something; he looked at the side of the truck and saw a man 
lying in the road. Prior to the moment when he heard this 
thump or bump, he did not see Mr. Kartchner (T. 173), 
and he was observing down the street at that time; that he 
traveled 13th South Street between 3rd and 4th East five 
or six days a week and was well acquainted with that street 
as well as the hard surface thereon, also the shoulders on 
the side and where they parked their cars, but had never seen 
people get out of their cars parked at that place; that he 
did not always drive as close to parked cars as he did on that 
day and he did it on that day because of heavy traffic (T. 174). 
He had a clear, unobstructed view from the corner up to the 
station wagon and was looking all the time and never did 
see Mr. Kartchner (T. 175); that he had a conversation with 
the brothers and Mr. Kartchner's mother (T. 176). In that 
conversation the driver said he explained to them that he 
turned to go up the street, and that it happened so fast he 
didn't know how it happened; that he didn't tell them that 
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he wasn't looking; that he did not see the door of the station 
wagon open (T. 177); that he was traveling about 20 miles 
per hour when he heard the thud; that he had a good view 
of the truck as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit · · B''; he had no 
idea he had struck a man ( T. 179) . There was nothing ~o 
obstruct his view on his side of the highway; that he was off 
the edge of the asphalt and on to the loose gravel (T. 181) 
The witness Keith Roberg, 10 years of age, testified that 
Kartchner had just closed the door when he got hit (T. 105; 
that deceased did not talk to him after he had closed the door 
(T. 109). 
The witness Ross C. Bradshaw was driving west on 13th 
South and was 60 or 75 feet east of the accident when it oc-
curred. The Dunford bread truck was going toward the parked 
station wagon and he glanced over and saw Mr. Kartchner, 
the deceased, standing by the side of his car facing east (T. 91); 
that the truck hit Mr. Kartchner, rolled him alo~g the front 
fender, over the hood of the station wagon, rolling him hand 
over foot (T. 91-92); that the deceased at the time of the 
accident was not standing much over a foot away from the car, 
that he did not see the deceased get out of the car-that he 
first noticed him standing at the side of the station wagon 
facing east. From the time he saw him until the time he was 
struck was approximately one second; that he was struck by 
11r. Mangum driving the Dunford bread truck; that from his 
observation Mr. Kartchner,the deceased, was struck from 6 
to 9 feet oH the main traveled portion of the road; that there 
were no other automobiles on the highway at the time between 
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Bradshaw and the station wagon, nor were there any auto-
mobiles in front of the Dunford bread truck at the time; 
the road was clear except for the Dunford bread truck going 
east and Bradshaw going west (T. 95-96). 
The witness Mrs. Elien Roberg, was present at a con-
versation on a Tuesday night about 6:30 or 7:30 P.M. after 
the accident, and the driver of the Dunford bread truck was 
also present together with other members of the deceased's 
family. At that time and place, the driver of the Dunford 
bread truck stated that he was looking down at his book or 
seat and he didn't know what happened (T. 190-191). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
The appellant asserts that the lower court erred in the 
giving of Instruction No. 7. 
POINT II 
That the court erred in giving Instruction No. 10. 
POINT III 
The court erred in submitting to the jury the question 
of assumption of risk on the part of the deceased for the reason 
that there was no issue between the parties which gave rise 
to the application of this doctrine and for the reason that the 
facts and circumstances shown by the evidence fails to indi-
10 
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.. · 
cate that the deceased could have assumed the risk of getting 
out of his station wagon on the left hand side. 
POINT IV 
The court erred in failing to give plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 3, in toto, substantially or in a modified form 
(T. 26). 
ARGUMENT 
The evidence in this cause, as detailed in the statement of 
facts, shows without substanital dispute that on the afternoon 
,)u.,NL 
of ~ 24, 1950, the deceased, Arnold Kartchtier, parked 
a station wagon which he was then driving~ on the south side 
of 13th Street immediately in front of his home and premises 
at No. }13 East 13th South Street; that his station wagon was 
parked within a matter of inches from the north edge of the 
south sidewalk. When he stopped at this point, a young 
boy, Keith Roberg, came over to his car and talked to the 
deceased. The deceased then opened the left hand door of 
the station wagon, got out of the car, shut the door, and was 
. standing at the side of the station wagon facing east when he 
was struck by the truck of the defendants, driven by their 
employee, Mantell Eccles Mangum. 
The testimony shows that the deceased was not more than 
a foot to the north of the station wagon. 13th South Street 
is covered with a hard surfaced material commencing at a 
point approximately 10 feet north of the north edge of the 
south sidewalk, and that the south edge of the travelled por-
tion of 13th South Street is 18 feet north of the north edge of 
the south sidewalk. The parked station wagon is approximate-
ll 
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ly 5 feet in width; the replica of the station wagon 
attached to Exhibit "A" is not drawn to accurate scale be-
cause this replica would indicate the station wagon to be 
approximately 71j2 feet in width, whereas in fact, this width 
should not exceed 5 feet, according to the testimony (T. 58). 
The station wagon therefore occupied 5 feet of the space be-
tween the north edge of the south sidewalk and the traveled por-
tion of the highway. The south side of the station wagon was 
within 6 inches to 1 foot from the north edge of the south side-
walk and Mr. Kratchner as he left the station wagon was about 
1 foot north of the north side of the station wagon. This left a 
distance of at least 11 feet between the point where Mr. Kratch-
ner was struck and the south edge of the traveled portion of the 
highway, and 3 feet from the extreme irregular edge of 
the hard surfaced portion of the road. These distances can 
well be calculated from the map, Exhibit "A," and from the 
testimony of the various witnesses. 
When the defendants' truck struck the body of the de-
ceased, it rolled him along the side of his station wagon and 
over the left fender. The course of the defendants' truck as 
it moved away from the traveled portion of the highway to 
the point of impact is not in substantial conflict. It is clear 
that the truck left the traveled part of the highway and turned 
in a slow arc until it struck the deceased. It is apparent from 
the course of the truck that the driver realized where he was 
a short distance from the point of impact, that he was heading 
toward the station wagon, because he then attempted to turn 
back on to the highway. The space between the south edge 
of the traveled portion of the highway to the north edge of 
the south sidewalk is 18 feet and this space is not ordinarily 
12 
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· ... · 
used for motor vehicle travel, and that the area immediately 
north of the south sidewalk was used for the parking of 
automobiles. 
There can be little doubt but that the operator of the de-
fendants' bread truck was guilty of negligence. Any doubt 
as to the right of the plaintiff to recover in this action would 
arise because of the application of the doctrine of contributory 
negligence. As to the negligence of the driver of the bread 
truck, it is admitted that his view of the street ahead of him 
was unobstructed. Mr. Bradshaw testified that there were no 
cars between his car moving west and the bread truck moving 
east. Mr. 1\{angum, the driver of the defendants' truck, ad-
mitted that after he made the turn to go east from 3rd East 
Street on 13th South, that he saw the station wagon of the 
deceased parked along the south side of the road parked 
parallel and close to the sidewalk, but that he did not see 
the deceased; that he was traveling about 20 miles an hour 
(T. 171-172). Mr. 11angum admitted that he stated a few 
days following the accident that he had turned to go up the 
street and that "It happened so fast that I didn't know how 
it happened" (T. 177). He also stated that he did not see 
the door of the station wagon open although it is clear that 
Mr. Kartchner did open the door, did get out of his car, shut 
the door, and was standing at the north side of the car facing 
east when he was struck (T. 177). Mr .Mangum on cross-
examination (T. 178) was asked: 
Q. How could he have gotten out without opening the 
door? 
13 
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A. He couldn't. 
Q. He must have opened the door and you never saw him 
open the door, did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you never saw him because you weren't looking, 
were you? 
A: It all happened so fast that I couldn't. 
Q. Answer my question. You weren't looking, were you? 
A. I was looking straight ahead. 
Q. And you didn't see him? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you didn't see the door open? 
A. That's right. (T. 178). 
The court in the light of the testimony instructed the 
jury on the question of the defendant's negligence in Instruc-
tion No. 6 (T. 14) that every driver of an automobile shall 
exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon 
or near any roadway to do any and all things which may 
appear necessary to avoid colliding with and injuring a pedes-
trian, and that a dri':'er is not excused from responsibility when 
he does not see a person which by the exercise of proper caution 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and observation he could have seen, and that if the jury be-
lieved from the evidence that the deceased was in plain view 
of the driver of the defendant's truck, and that the driver 
either saw or by the exercise of proper caution and observation 
could have seen the deceased, and that he failed to do so, that 
such want or care on the part of the driver of the bread truck 
would constitute negligence. We think this instnKtion cor-
rectly presented the question of the defendants' negligence to 
the jury and on the basis of such instruction and the undisputed 
facts, there could be no questoin but what a jury would have 
been compelled to find the defendants guilty of negligence 
in causing or contributing to the death of the deceased. In 
fact it would seem clear from the evidence that the court could 
well have told the jury that the defendants' driver was guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law. 
POINT I 
In the light of the testimony above detailed, the court 
instructed the jury by Instruction No. 7 (T. 15) as follows: 
"You are instructed that a person cannot deliberately 
incur an obvious risk of personal injury, particularly 
when there is a safe course of action open to him, and 
then hold the author of the danger liable in damages 
for any injuries sustained. 
If you find from the evidence in this case, that the 
deceased, Arnold Kartchner, placed himself in a po-
sition of obvious peril when there was no reasonable 
justification therefor, then the said Arnold Kartchner 
is deemed to have assumed the risk of his course of 
conduct and your verdict must be in favor of the de-
fendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action." 
15 
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This instruction was duly excepted to (T. 208). 
We contend that this· instruction is clearly in error. No 
reasonable claim could be made that the deceased was negli-
gent in parking his station wagon on the south side of 13th 
South Street within a matter of inches from the north edge of 
the south sidewalk. He placed his car in the area used for 
parking automobiles along the street. If the deceased could 
be regarded as being in any way negligent, it would arise out 
out the fact that he got out of his station wagon from the 
north or left hand side which would be a point closer to the 
traveled portion of the highway than if he had left his auto-
mobile on the right hand side. 
Un_der the wording of this instruction, the jury might 
well have concluded that the deceased was negligent as a 
matter of law in getting out of his station wagon on the left 
hand side. The instruction at least assumes that there was 
some evidence in the case from which the jury might conclude 
that the deceased deliberately incurred an obvious risk of 
personal injury. This thought is further projected into the 
instruction in the second paragraph where the court states: 
"If it is found that the deceased placed himself in a position 
of obvious peril without justification, then the deceased is 
deemed to have assumed the risk of his course of conduct, 
and that the jury must then find the issues against the plain-
tiff." 
We submit there is no evidence in the record which shows, 
or from which any reasonable inference can be drawn that the 
' 
16 
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deceased in alighting from his station wagon on the left hand 
side did in fact place himself in obvious peril, or did thereby 
deliberately incur an obvious risk. This in turn assumes that 
the deceased knew, or was charged with knowledge, that there 
was a danger of moving automobiles and trucks coming over 
on to the parking area of the street where automobiles are 
not ordinarily driven. It further assumes that there is some 
evidence in the record that the deceased knew of the risk to 
be thus encountered and knew that it endangered his safety. 
He could not be charged with knowledge that trucks or auto-
mobiles would be apt to leave the traveled portion of the 
highway and without slowing or stopping suddenly turn 
on to the shoulder and parking area of the road. There is 
not a word of evidence to show that the deceased either knew 
the truck was approaching the parking area or that it was 
coming toward his position in the parking area, nor would the 
deceased be required to anticipate that the drivers of trucks 
or other vehicles would fail to keep a proper lookout or fail 
to keep their respective cars or trucks under control. It is 
undoubtedly true that it would have been safer for the de-
ceased to have gotten out of the right hand side of his car, 
but certainly he was under no legal duty to do so, and he 
cannot be regarded as negligent merely because he alights 
from his car at least 12 feet away from where automobiles 
and trucks are ordinarily operated on the highway. 
The only testimony in the record which would indicate 
any negligence on the part of the deceased was the testimony 
of the driver of the truck that he did ·see the deceased's car, 
but did not see the deceased, from which a possible inference 
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might be drawn that between the time the truck driver saw the 
station wagon, the deceased suddenly got out of his car in 
time to be struck. The only other alternative from which 
negligence on the part of the deceased could be inferred 
would be the fact that he did get out of the left hand side 
of his car, and we submit that such conduct on the part of 
the deceased was not negligence even though it may not have 
been the safer course. Certainly Instruction No. 7 would 
be misleading because it would convey to the jury the impres-
sion that there was some evidence in the record from which 
it could be said that the deceased did incur an obvious risk 
of personal injury, otherwise such an instruction would not 
have been given. There is no evidence from which any in-
ference can be drawn that the deceased placed himself in a 
position of obvious peril. "Obvious" means open and ap-
parent, and there is nothing to indicate that when the deceased 
got out of his car that he knew or had any reason to antici-
pate that the bread truck was going to leave the traveled por-
tion of the highway and strike him down as he was standing 
close to his parked automobile, and when the court adds that 
the deceased must be deemed to have assumed the risk of 
his course of conduct, it again would give the impression 
that the deceased placed himself in a position of obvious 
peril, and that he thereby assumed the risk of his course of 
conduct by getting out of the left hand side of his automobile. 
Furthermore, Instruction No. 7 is prejudicial to the plaintiff 
herein because nowhere in the instruction dirl the court say 
that the conduct of the deceased should have been the proxi-
mate contributing cause of the accident. 
The court instructed the- jury in Instruction No. 3 that 
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contributory negligence means that a person injured has proxi-
mately contributed to such injury by his want of ordinary care; 
but the court by Instruction No. 7 entirely departs from this 
instruction to bring an entirely new theory into the case other 
than the duty to exercise ordinary care and, as we view the 
instruction considered in the light of the evidence, is tantamount 
to a directed verdict in favor of the defendants. We think 
at all events the rule of law that would be applicable under 
the circumstances in this case is simply the exercise of ordinary 
care in view of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the deceased at the time of the accident. 
The court by Instruction No. 5 placed that duty of ordinary 
care upon the defendants for the purpose of measuring the 
conduct of the defendants and no greater duty should have 
been placed upon the deceased. We submit that the court by 
defendants' request of Instruction No. 7 was prevailed upon 
to depart from the rule requiring the exercise of ordinary 
care and to place upon the deceased a much greater duty and 
obligation than was justified under any of the testimony or 
evidence adduced at the trial. In other words, we think that 
if the facts justify an instruction along the line of Instruction 
No. 7, then the jury should have been told that it was the duty 
of the deceased in getting out of his station wagon to exercise 
ordinary care in observing the conditions of travel along 13th 
South Street at and near the point of the accident, and that if 
the jury from the testimony believed that the deceased failed 
to exercise ordinary care in view of all of the facts and cir-
cumstances in alighting from his automobile or failed to 
observe traffic along said street which was then and there 
open and obvious, and if the jury believed that such want 
of ordinary care was the proximate or contributing cause 
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of the resulting injury and death of the deceased, that then 
their verdict should be for the defendants and against the 
plaintiff. 
We think the rule of law which should control the ques-
tion of the deceased's contributory negligence is set forth in 
the cases hereinafter cited, to the effect that the rule of con-
tributory negligence gives no support to a claim that a driver 
of an automobile or truck may heedlessly run down those 
who are where they have a right to be, and particularly so 
where reasonable men may differ concerning the pruden(e 
exercised by the injured person. It was pointed out by this 
Court in the Case of BARKER vs. SAVAS, 52 Ut. 262, 172 Pac. 
672, that if the defendant had looked ahead as was his duty to 
do, there was nothing to prevent his seeing the deceased; that 
it was his duty to look ahead in the exercise of reasonable 
care, and that his duty to so look is generally recognized as 
to be beyond all controversy. 
The defendant Savas was driving his car north on Red-
wood road at the same time a 6 year old child was riding a 
tricycle north of the easterly side of Redwood Road.· The 
child was struck by the defendant's car causing fatal injuries. 
The following is cited from the Savas case (Page 674): 
"But it is contended by appellant that there is no 
evidence of negligence on his part, or want of due 
care in driving his machine. The circumstances tend 
to show that the deceased was riding his tricycle on 
the east side of the road, near the very edge of the 
traveled thoroughfare, where he should have been in 
the exercise of reasonable care. Huddy on Automobiles 
(3d Ed.) Sec. 120." · 
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"All of the remainder of the road lying west of 
where the deceased was riding was open to the defend-
ant. He was behind the deceased, with nothing to ob-
scure or obstruct his vision. If he had looked ahead, 
as was his duty to do, there was nothing to prevent 
his seeing the deceased in time to avoid the collision. 
That it was his duty to look ahead in the exercise of 
reasonable care, in cases of this kind, is so generally 
recognized as a legal duty as to be beyond all contro-
versy. Indeed the doctrine is elementary.'' 
"In this case the deceased was riding his tricycle on 
the highway, as he had the right to do. He was riding 
north, and the circumstances indicate he was on the 
extreme east side of the road, as was his duty in the 
exercise of reasonable care. Defendant's automobile 
approached from the rear. His vision was unobstructed; 
he could have seen deceased if he had looked, and the 
law imposed upon him that duty." 
"As regards the question of the deceased's negli-
gence, the evidence tends to show affirmatively that 
he was not negligent. Besides this, if it be said that a 
child of his age can be guilty of contributory negligence, 
in this case there being no evidence to the contrary, 
the law presumes he was in the exercise of due care, 
and the burden was on the defendant to rebut this 
presumption. LEWIS V. RAILROAD CO., 40 Utah, 
483, and cases cited at pages 494 and 495, 123 Pac. 97." 
See also the case of REAGAN v. LOS ANGELES ICE & 
COLD STORAGE CO., (Cal), reported in 189 Pac. 474. 
LZ The facts in this case are as follows: 
t'l' 
:~ A Buick touring car of the plaintiff was parked close to 
1 the curb and headed in an easterly direction on the street. 
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The plaintiff and another man were standing on the left hand 
side of the car. The street at that point was from 60 to 70 
feet wide. The day was clear. At the moment of the accident, 
the plaintiff was standing close to and back of the left rear 
mud guard of his car. Plaintiff was struck by defendant's on-
coming machine and killed. 
Quoting from Page 475 of the Decision: 
"The rules of law applicable to such cases are well 
established. The negligence of a plaintiff which di-
rectly contributes to his injury bars recovery. One using 
a public street is charged with the duty of observing 
approaching vehicles, it is true, but this rule is qualified 
and explained by the more general rule that, except 
in cases where the law itself fixes a standard of care, 
negligence is always relative and to be determined in 
view of all the circumstances of the particular case. 
Thus, if there was a plainly visible obstruction in a 
street, a person taking position on or immediately in 
front of it would be in a position of safety and might 
be relieved from the duty of observing traffic as he 
would be if he remained on the sidewalk. The standing 
automobile was a clearly visible obstruction in the course 
of the on-coming truck. Whether its driver simply 
continued in a straight course along the curving street, 
or, as some of the witnesses testified swerved towards 
the obstruction, is of no importance. He heedlessly 
drove the truck upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff was 
in a position where, if it could not be said, as a matter 
of law, he had a right to assume he would not be run 
down, ~easonable prudent men might have drawn that 
concluston of fact. It certainly cannot be said as a matter 
of law that he was guilty of negligence. The rule of con-
tribut~ry negligence gives no support to the claim that 
the dnver of an automobile or truck may heedlessly or 
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wantonly run down those who are where they have a 
right to be, particularly if reasonable when may differ 
concerning the prudence exercised by the injured per-
son." 
ISS" 
STEPHENSON v. PARTON et al. (Wash), ~ Pac. 147: 
The facts in this case are as follows: 
The plaintiff had parked on the left hand side of the 
road with his wagon, used by him as a mail carrier. While 
standing on the right side of his wagon and in plain view of 
the defendant's on-coming vehicle, he was struck and killed. 
It was a bright clear day, the road was level and smooth, the 
road \vas 17 feet wide and no traffic. W' e quote from the 
opinion, Page 149, as follows: 
"In Lewis v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 72 Wash. 320, 130 
Pac. 341, we said: 
'The footman may rely on the presumption that, so 
long as he occupies one place or pursues a given course·, 
he need not be run into, and to fail to keep a lookout 
for the approach of such vehicles is not necessarily 
want of care. The degree of care required of such a 
person of course varies with the circumstances. It de-
pends largely upon place and upon the condition of the 
street; whether the street is crowded with traffic or 
comparatively free therefrom; whether he enters lhe 
street at a place usually used by travelers on foot, and 
perhaps on many other conditions; but the degree of 
care required is ordinary care under the circumstt~.nces; 
and this, as we say, may be vastly different from orJi-
nary care with reference to crossing fixed tracks upon 
which railway or street cars are operated.' " 
"It follows that if the deceased was standing in the 
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road attending to his business, it w~s de~rly the duty 
of Miss Parton to avoid him in passmg wtth her auto-
mobile, especially where there was ample room for so 
doing." 
GOOSCHIN v. LADD 33 P.(2d), (Wash.), 653: 
The accident happened January 18, 1932, at about 12:45 
A.M. near the city of Seattle. The plaintiff had attempted to 
back his automobile off the pavement and became stuck in 
the mud and was unable to move it therefrom. The evidence 
is in dispute whether his car was 2, 3, or 4 feet off the pave-
ment. While he was standing by his left front fender, he 
was struck by an on-coming vehicle. We quote from the opinion, 
Page 655: 
"It is first contended that the respondent was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The 
evidence upon the question as to whether the left front 
of the Hudson was off or on the pavement is in dispute. 
The respondent says that the left front of the Hudson 
was ' * * * about two or two and a half feet from the 
pavement. I am quite certain of that. I was standing 
in that parking, between the pavement and my front, 
left front. I was clear off the highway. My lights were 
working that night. They were on all the time. They 
were on at the time that I last remember. I did not at 
any time see this car that struck me. I never saw it. I 
did not see it before·J got out of the car. I looked around 
and I couldn't see anything. I didn't see anything ap-
proaching then.' " 
"Other witnesses testified that the left front of the 
respondent's car extended out onto the pavement about 
4 feet. If the respondent's car was entirely clear of the 
pavement and he was standing in the space between 
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the edge of the pavement and the car, we see nothing 
upon which to base the charge of contributory negli-
gence." 
FABRICIUS v. VIEIRA et al. (Cal.) 233 P. 397: 
The facts in the case are as follows: 
On a Sunday afternoon about 3·:00 o'clock, the plaintiff 
had occasion to drive his car off the paved part of the highway 
to the right and stop same because of motor trouble. Evidence 
shows he was parked from 18 inches to 4 feet off the edge of 
the pavement. Defendant's testimony showed he was from 
2V2 to 3 feet from the edge of the pavement. Plaintiff was 
standing in a stooped position on the left side of his auto-
mobile adjusting the carburetor when the defendant's on-
coming truck struck the plaintiff and caused the injuries of 
which complaint is made. The pavement was 18 feet wide at 
the scene of the accident, and plaintiff could have parked his 
automobile at a greater distance from pavement. He made 
no effort to observe approaching vehicles while adjusting the 
carburetor. 
We quote as follows from Page 397: 
·'There is no doubt as to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to show that the driver of the truck was guilty 
of actionable negligence which was the proximate 
cause of the injury. It is equally clear that the evidence 
does not show, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence. These conclu-
sions so clearly appear from a mere statement of the 
evidence that further discussion is deemed unnecessary," 
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In the case of DEITCHLER v. BALL (Wash.) 170 Pac. 123, 
the plaintiff was struck by the defendants' truck while he was 
standing by his car putting up the top and fastening the straps 
over the front to hold the top down. It was claimed that the 
plaintiff under such circumstances was guilty of contributory 
negligence, but the court said: 
"It was not necessary for him to pay particular at-
tention to passers-by who had plenty of room to avoid 
him. The respondent, no doubt, as contended by the 
appellant, was required to use ordinary, reasonable 
care for his safety, and if his testimony is to be believed 
at all, he did so when he was standing close to his 
car attending to his business, and was not putting him-
self in the way of danger." 
A rather recent <:ase, HADLEYv. SIMPSON, 115 Pac. 2 (d) 
675, held that travelers on the highways are justified in assum-
ing that other drivers will observe the rules of the road and 
may act upon that assumption without being guilty of con-
tributory negligence. Citing: Richmond v. Tacoma Railway 
&Power Co., 67 Wash. 44, 122 P. 351; Stubbs v. Molberget, 
108 Wash. 89, 182 P. 936, 6 A.L.R. 318. 
In thecaseofSHANNONv. THO.MAS (Cal) 134Pac2(d) 
522, the plaintiff was struck by the defendant's automobile 
while pushing his automobile down the highway. The court 
said: 
"Furthermore, it must be said that reasonable minds 
could at least well differ as to whether appellants were 
justified in assuming they could make the turn with 
reasonable safety, and it must not be forgotten that 
appellants had a right to assume that respondent would 
observe them making the turn on the highway, and 
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therefore slacken his speed or make a turn to the right 
or left of appellant's vehicle thereby avoiding a col-
lision. Kennedy v. Berg, 18 Cal. App. 2d 53, 62 P.2d 
1374; Flury v. Beeskau, 139 Cal. App. 398, 33 P. 2d 
1033." -
In the case of HAYES v. AXELRED, 332 Pa. 518 3A 2d 346 
( 1939), the plaintiff was a milkman, and was alighting on 
the left side from his wagon, and a~ down on the lowest 
step when he was struck by the defendant. He was parked 
close to the curb of the street, and there was ample width for 
two vehicles to pass without crowding each other. The acci-
dent happened on a clear day. 
"In affirming the judgment, the court said: "It is 
obvious that plaintiff made out a case of negligence 
against defendant. It was in evidence that the accident 
happened on a 'clear day.' In order to hit the plaintiff 
defendant's car must have been running closer to the 
milk wagon than is consistent with due care. Plain-
tiff's wagon . . . was parked close to the curb on a 
street of ample width for two vehicles to pass without 
'crowding' each other ... As defendant's truck was in 
rapid motion, it was the duty of the driver to look 
where he was going ... At the argument (defendant) 
stressed plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence. 
Under the facts of this case it cannot be declared as 
a matter of law that the plaintiff did not disclose a case 
free from contributory negligence. Plaintiff had a right 
to assume that while he was on the step of his milk 
wagon, attending to his accustomed business, he would 
not be struck by any vehicle that was under proper 
control. He had not placed himself in a position of 
manifest danger.'' '' 
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POINT II 
Appellant further asserts that the court erred in instructing 
the jury by Instruction No. 10 as follows (T. 18 duly excepted 
to T. 208): 
"You are instructed that every person is bound to 
the exercise of vigilance with the view to discovery of 
perils by which he may be menaced and their avoidance 
after they are ascertained. Every person is bound to use 
due diligence to save his person from injury by the negli-
gent act of another. 
If you find from the evidence in this case that the 
deceased, Arnold Kartchner, failed to exercise vigilance 
to discover the approach of traffic and particularly to 
discove~ the truck being then and there operated by 
Montel Mangum and that such failure to exercise vigi-
lance was a proximate cause of the fatal injury sus-
tained by the said Arnold Kartchner, then your verdict 
must be in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action." 
By the foregoing instruction the court placed on the 
deceased a duty of vigilance thereby departing from the rule 
of ordinary care. There is no evidence in the record that the 
deceased failed to exercise ordinary care when he parked his 
automobile at the curb and left the same from the left hand 
or north door. The defendants' truck after turning east on 
13th South traveled only a distance of 167 feet until it struck 
the deceased's body. At a speed of 20 miles per hour this 
would require only a matter of seconds. It is quite apparent 
that when the deceased parked his automobile, the bread truck 
would not have been in view. 
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The witness Keith Roberg on cross-examination was 
asked: 
Q. "Keith, was Uncle Arnold talking to you when he got 
out of the car?" 
A. "No. Not after he closed the door." (T. 109). 
This would infer that they did have some conversation after 
deceased got out of the car and before he closed the door so 
that when the deceased got out of the station wagon and prob-
ably had a conversation with Keith and then closed the door 
this would have taken up at least 7 to 10 seconds and the 
driver of the truck testified to traveling 20 miles per hour or 
30 feet per second. This would manifestly show and prove 
that the defendants' truck was not in view of the deceased at 
the time he got out of his station wagon. Further, it proves 
that the deceased was in dear view of the defendants' truck 
driver during all of the time that he was traveling east on 
13th South and consequently had ample time to have avoided 
striking and killing the deceased, had he been looking as was 
his legal duty to do so. It is also clear that when he opened 
the door of his car to alight therefrom, the bread truck would 
not have been in such a position on the roadway as to indicate 
danger to the deceased. In this position, the deceased had a 
right to assume that any cars traveling east on 13th South 
would not leave the ordinary traveled portion of the highway 
as did the bread truck, and run over into the parking area. 
If a duty of vigilance rested upon the deceased, it would 
be difficult to point out in what way the deceased failed to 
exercise vigilance or ordinary care under the circumstances sur-
rounding the accident. We can see no facts which would cast 
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upon the deceased the duty to exercise vigilance under the etr-
cumstances disclosed by the evidence for the purpose of dis-
covering a motor vehicle which at the time of the accident was 
being operated entirely off the portion of the highway normally 
used by motor vehicles. There is no evidence in the record 
that the deceased knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care 
could have anticipated that the bread truck would suddenly 
leave the traveled portion of the highway and proceed directly 
toward the deceased. To say to the jury as the court did in 
Instruction No. 10 that if they believed from the evidence 
that the deceased failed to exercise vigilance to discover the 
approach of the bread truck simply invites the attention of 
the jury to a situation concerning which there is no evidence 
upon which the jury could possibly make such a finding. To 
say that every person is bound to exercise vigilance with the 
view to discovery of perils is not a correct application of a 
legal principle unless some facts or circumstances are shown 
which require vigilance in the exercise of reasonable care. 
The cases which we have cited under Point I are all ap-
plicable to Instruction No. 10 and reference to all of said cases 
is hereby made in support of the appellant's claim that In-
struction No. 10 was erroneous and prejudicial to the rights 
of the appellant. 
We think the holdings of the court in the Deitchler and 
Hadley cases cited herein are peculiarly applicable to the 
situation of the deceased in the case at bar. It was not nec-
essary for him to pay particular attention to passers-by who 
had plenty of room to avoid him. The deceased did not place 
himself in the way of any danger that was open or obvious 
and he had the right to assume that motorists upon the high-
way would exercise reasonable care and would not depart 
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from the traveled portion of the highway and run into the 
deceased while he was in a comparative place of safety, also 
that deceased was required to use ordinary care, and he did 
so, when he stood close to his car attending to his own busi-
ness, and such were the facts in the instant case. 
POINT NO. III 
The defendants' answer (T. 5) sets up four defenses: 
First, that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; sec-
ond, an admission and denial of portions of the plaintiffs 
complaint; third, that the death of the deceased was solely 
and proximate~y caused by his own negligence; and fourth, 
that the deceased was himself guilty of contributory negli-
gence which was a substantial, proximate cause of his death. 
No defense is set forth in the defendants' answer that the 
deceased assumed the risk of the danger to which he was sub-
jected by the operation of the defendants' truck. 
Notwithstanding the failure to allege the defense of 
the assumption of risk, the court in Instruction No. 7 told 
the jury that if the deceased placed himself in a position of 
peril when there was no reasonable justification therefor, that 
then the deceased assumed the risk of his course of conduct. 
We submit that this was not an issue properly to be sub-
mitted to the jury for want of a proper pleading. Further-
more, as we have heretofore attempted to set forth, there was 
no fact or circumstances in evidence from which any inference 
could be drawn that the deceased voluntarily placed himself 
in a position of danger or obvious peril. \X' e further submit 
that the evidence fails to disclose any conduct on the part of 
the deceased from which the inference could be drawn that 
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he was guilty of any negligence proximately contributing to 
the accident. 
The courts generally have recognized that there is a clear 
dictinction between the defense of assumption of risk and the 
defense of contributory negligence, notwithstanding that they 
may arise under the same set of facts and may sometimes over-
lap. The defense of assumption of risk ordinarily involves a 
choice made more or less deliberately without reference to 
the fact of the exercise of due care. The principal element 
of the defense of assumption of risk is knowledge and ap· 
preciation of danger. The doctrine under the authorities 
does not apply unless the particular condition of danger or 
peril has continued long enough so that the person alleged 
to have assumed the risk can be said to have known or to have 
been charged with knowledge of the danger. The application 
of the defense of assumption of risk more frequently arises 
out of the relationship of master and servant. In ot_her actions, 
the defense is usually .confined to cases where the plaintiff 
not only knew and appreciated the danger, but voluntarily 
put himself in the way of it. (See 38 Am. Jur., Title "Negi-
gence," Sections 1 71-1 7 3) . 
As will be noted from the defendant's answer (T. 5), the 
doctrine of assumption of risk was never pleaded as a defense 
and there is not one iota of evidence introduced in this action 
to substantiate or support the doctrine of assumption of risk. 
Therefore, the court in giving Instruction No. 7 particularly 
and also Instruction No. 10 erred OQ. these grounds and we 
quote from the case of HILLYARD v. BAIR, 47 Ut. 561, 
155 Pac. 449, at Page 450: 
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"It is a well recognized rule of law that the instruc-
tions to the jury should conform to the issues presented 
by the pleadings and those raised by the evidence. w· e 
think the instruction complained of clearly offends 
against this rule." 
See also the following case, DAVIS v. 11IDVALE CITY, 
56 Ut. 1, 189 Pac. 74, and particularly Page 78 and we quote 
from therein as follows: 
"Instructions should be confined to the issues pre-
sented by the pleadings and the evidence. It is improper 
to give an instruction announcing a naked legal propo-
sition, however correct it may be, unless it bears upon 
and is connected with the issues involved; and unless, 
further, there has been received some competent evi-
dence to which the jury may apply it. Such an instruc-
tion tends to distract the minds of the jury from the 
real question submitted to them for determination, 
and· thereby mislead them, and, if requested, may be 
properly refused." 38 Cyc. 1612, 161;·. 
"In determining ·the scope of its instructions, the 
court must keep in mind the issues made by the plead-
ings in the cause; and the general rule is that all in-
structions must be confined to those issues, and the 
evidence in support thereof, and that no instruction 
should be given which tenders an issue that is not 
supported by the pleadings or which deviates therefrom 
in any material respect." 14 R.C.L. 784, 785. 
"Instructions to a jury must be based upon, and be 
applicable to, the pleadings and evidence. Instructions 
should be neither broader nor narrower than the plead-
ings, they should be predicated on all the issues raised 
by the pleadings and supported by the evidence, and 
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they are equally faulty whether they enlarge or restrict 
the issues.'' 
Also many cases are cited to substantiate this po-
sition. 
It is our position in the instant case that the court erred 
in giving Instruction No. 7 particularly on the assumption of 
risk doctrine, when it was never plead and no evidence intro-
duced thereon, thereby making it highly prejudicial to the 
rights of the plaintiff in this action. 
In construing the evidence we must have in mind that 
generally speaking every person has the right to assume that 
another will obey the law and perform his duty. The pre-
sumption is that duties fixed by law will be discharged ac-
cordingly and everyone to whom a duty of care is owing has a 
right to assume that it will be performed in compliance with 
the law under which it arises. The failure of a plaintiff to 
anticipate the negligence of another does not constitute negli-
gence on his part. (See 38 Am. Jur., Title: "Negligence," 
Section 192). 
POINT NO.4 
With respect to Point 4, we wish to call the court's 
attention to plaintiff's Request No. 3 which was refused by 
the Court and is worded as follows: 
• 
"If you believe from the evidence that the deceased, 
Arnold G. Kartchner, was standing at the left front 
door of his automobile or was in the act of leaving 
or had just left his car by the said left front door at 
the time of the accident, and that said car was parked 
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on or near the sidewalk running in an easterly and 
westerly direction on the south side of 13th South, then 
the court instructs you that the said Arnold G. Kartch-
ner was in a place where he had a legal right to be, 
and if you believe from the evidence that he was struck 
by defendants' truck at said time and place and thereby 
was injured and died as a result of the injury, then 
the court instructs you that the plaintiff in this case 
would have a right to recover for the death of said Ar-
nold G. Kartchner in such an amount as you shall find 
under all of the circumstances as may be just." 
It is our contention that the court erred in failing to give 
this request in toto, substantially, or in a modified form as we 
think that this is the law that is applicable to the facts in the 
instant case, particularly that the said Arnold G. Kartchner, 
the deceased was in a place where he had a legal right to be, 
and that the defendants' driver was definitely negligent in 
leaving the main traveled highway and striking the deceased 
while he was standing very near his station wagon. This con-
tention is supported by the cases heretofore cited in this brief. 
We respectfully submit that in view of the established 
physical facts considered in the light of a fair interpretation 
of the evidence that Instructions No. 7 and 10 failed to cor-
rectly state the law; that the court misapplied the application 
of the doctrine of assumption of risk; that the court erred 111 
not giving plaintiffs request No. 3, all of which were prejudi-
cial to the rights of the plaintiff and the heirs-at-law of said 
deceased; that the judgment of no cause of action should be 
vacated and set aside and a new trial ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOE P. BOSONE, 
A.H.HOUGAARD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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